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The New
Management
Imperative
COMPLIANCE WITH

THE

ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS OF THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES A C T

• The law's title is a misnomer- it significantly
impacts all companies, domestic as well as
international, and especially public companies.
• Compliance places added responsibilities on
management, the board of directors and the
audit committee.
• Here's a review of the law-and
recommendations for obtaining effective
compliance.
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Summary, and a Plan of Action
How a publicly-held business is controlled and
keeps its records are now matters of legal
compulsion, with fines and jail sentences for
offenders. These are probably the most significant
facts of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (the Act)—yet most of its publicity has
dealt with the penalties for bribes of foreign
officials.
Perhaps more significant in the long run than
possible fines and jail terms is the possibility of
misguided and unintended use of the Act by
regulatory agencies. A number of individual
allegations could devolve to a set of requirements
that would hamstring publicly-held businesses.
Yet responsible and timely action by business,
professional and regulatory leaders, in a cooperative effort, can attain the purposes of the Act
without needlessly rigid rules.
The Act says, broadly:
• Bribes and questionable conduct must stop.
• Funds for bribes and questionable financial
activities must be unavailable, and steps must
be taken to assure that unavailability.
• The steps that constitute companies' internal
accounting and record keeping systems must
be examined and almost invariably corrected
where material weaknesses are found.
The Act applies* through two of its sections,
Accounting Standards and Foreign Corrupt Practices by Issuers, to every company, domestic or
foreign, subject to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
The Act expects management to be aware, to
make judgments, to choose, and to take adequate
steps to address deficiencies. Management can
assume, if it wishes, that no action is required
—that its responsibilities have not changed, that
there are no new obligations. But wishes do not
eliminate risks. And we see a new connection.
What was conceptual, ethereal, a tenet of faith,
has been mandated by Congress and is now
law—to be interpreted, perhaps misunderstood
and definitely enforced.
Much of the interpretation and enforcement of
the Act will deal not with its antibribery provisions (which are relatively specific) but with its

"Accounting Standards Provisions" (which are
not). These provisions were drawn from auditors'
pronouncements and will be quite difficult to
apply. The writers of the Act recognized that
judgments and estimates are needed to determine
the degree of internal accounting control and
record keeping that is appropriate for any company, and they put that burden on management.
A prudent course for management—given the
regulatory authorities' assigned responsibility,
and mindful of the righteous, inquisitorial environment in which the law was adopted—involves
action. Companies affected should make a systematic and documented effort to review the
adequacy of record keeping and internal controls
and should make any improvements that business
judgment dictates are advisable.
If a company's systems provide reasonable
assurance of achieving the objectives of internal
accounting control, and if a company's systems
have been modified to recognize the specifics and
the intent of the Act, then we believe management has demonstrated compliance with the Act.
This is not to say that an actual violation of the
Act will not be alleged, but rather that management has exercised due care in attempting to
meet a responsibility amidst significant and valid
differences of opinion as to how to comply.
Given very few authoritative regulatory
guidelines, management will find that internal
and outside auditors can be especially helpful.
The board and the audit committee will find that
in setting appropriate policy, as in monitoring
progress, the independent accountant will be an
indispensible aid. And we, as study of this
booklet will confirm, stand ready and able to
assist.
*And it applies to practically everybody else through a
section labeled Foreign Corrupt Practices by Domestic
Concerns, including
• any individual who is a citizen, national or resident of the
U.S.
• any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization or sole
proprietorship that: a) has its principal place of business in
the U.S., or b) is organized under the laws of a state,
territory, possession or commonwealth of the U.S.
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Part I

The Law and its Significance

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, signed in
December, 1977, and reprinted in pertinent part
within Appendix A , grew from fertile soil
—including the following:
• The use of corporate resources for bribery of
foreign officials and for domestic political
contributions, as investigated by the Office of
the Watergate Special Prosecutor and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Some of these payments were illegal at the
time, others were at least questionable. Many
were made through "off-the-books" bank accounts and other methods that circumvented
internal accounting control systems.
• The findings and recommendations of the
SEC's "Report on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practices," issued to
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee May 12, 1976. The SEC
recommended that Congress enact legislation
to improve the accuracy of corporate books
and records.
• The hearings on illegal and questionable business payments conducted by the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee.
This committee also proposed legislation, part
of which was incorporated in the Act.
SYNOPSIS O F T H E A C T
The Act contains three sections relevant to this
discussion:
2

—Accounting Standards
—Foreign Corrupt Practices by Issuers
—Foreign Corrupt Practices by Domestic
Concerns
The Foreign Corrupt Practices sections deal
primarily with bribes, questionable conduct, and
stopping same. Much of what was questionable is
now specifically illegal. While the antibribery
provisions of the Act are relatively clear, the
rest—most notably the "Accounting Standards"
provisions—are cloudy, and will be difficult to
interpret, apply, and comply with. Our interpretation of these provisions, and how to comply with
them, are the ingredients of this booklet.
If your company is subject to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Accounting
Standards
Provisions of the Act require that you keep, in
reasonable detail, "books, records, and accounts"
which accurately and fairly reflect the company's
transactions and dispositions of assets; your company must also maintain a system of internal
accounting controls providing "reasonable assurances" that:
"(i) transactions are executed in accordance
with managment's general or specific authorization;
"(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary
(I) to permit preparation of financial statements
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to

account-

might connote a degree of exactitude and
precision which is unrealistic."

"(iii) access to assets is permitted only in
accordance
with management's
general or
specific authorization; and

In considering compliance with the Act, both
Congress's intent and the concept of reasonableness should be applied in determining the action
to be taken. 2
Despite the structure of the law, it is critical to
recognize that financial record keeping is not
truly separable from the internal accounting
systems that generate the records. Therefore, a
plan of action to demonstrate compliance with
the record keeping requirements of the Act must
consider a company's internal control system and
especially i n t e r n a l accounting
controls—
acceptable record keeping is rarely attainable
without acceptable internal accounting controls.

such statements, and (II) to maintain
ability for assets;

"(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is
compared with the existing assets at reasonable
intervals and appropriate action is taken with
respect to any differences."
Record Keeping Requirements
The intent of the Act's record keeping systems
requirement is to—
• Enable preparation of appropriate
financial statements, and

external

• Prevent or signal illegal payments so that
senior management and the board of directors
or its audit committee can take appropriate
action.
This last requirement is clearly indicated in the
Conference Report 1 that says:
" . . . the issuer's records should reflect
transactions in conformity with generally
accepted methods of recording economic
events and effectively prevent off-the-books
slush funds and payments of bribes."
The Conference Report also recognizes that
significant amounts of judgment are required in
attempts to comply, and that perfection is unattainable. For example, the same part of the
Conference Report says:
" T h e House receded to the Senate with an
amendment requiring such books, records
and accounts to be made and maintained
accurately and fairly 'in reasonable detail'.
The conference committee adopted the 'in
reasonable detail' qualification to the accurate and fair requirement in light of the
concern that such a standard, if unqualified,

Internal—and Internal Accounting—Control
Internal control is essentially organization and
procedures—the nervous system that activates
overall operating policies and keeps a business
within practical performance ranges. Every business has it, however unsophisticated. Each system
of internal control, notwithstanding its superficial
resemblance to common patterns of organization
and management, is unique. It includes people
with varying authorities and capacities of supervision and with varying abilities to delegate or
assume authority.
" I n a corporation, internal control commences with the . . . enforcement of top
policies established by boards of directors
and continues down through the organizational structure, taking form in the development and operation of management policies,
administrative regulations, manuals, directives, and decisions; internal auditing; internal check; reporting; employee training and
participation." 3
Internal accounting control must be defined
more narrowly. Auditors, whose primary respon3

sibility is to examine and report on financial
representations of others, have sought those
aspects of a company's internal control system
that could affect the auditor's examination (see
(i)—(iv), on pages 2 and 3). This we define as the
internal accounting control system. While inherently subjective, it is an improved formulation of
objectives (for organizations and procedures)
from the auditor's perspective. These objectives,
as well as the manner in which they were
developed and are used by the auditors, are
described in pronouncements by the AICPA. 4
They must be understood because the writers of
the Act's Accounting Standards Provisions
specifically selected the A I C P A ' s language
defining internal accounting control.

T H E SEC VIEW ON E N F O R C E M E N T
Two months after adoption of the Act, the
SEC explained its responsibilities for enforcement as follows: 5
" T h e legislative history of the Act reflects
that the Commission's enforcement responsibilities extend to conducting investigations,
bringing civil injunctive actions, commencing
administrative proceedings if appropriate,
including public or private disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Rule 2(e) of the
Commission's Rules of Practice, and referring cases to the Justice Department for
criminal prosecution where warranted, just
as the Commission currently does with respect to its existing responsibilities under the
federal securities laws. In addition, as is true
with respect to violations of other provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act, controlling
persons of an issuer may be liable for
violations of the new requirements, and a
negligence standard will govern civil injunctive actions brought to enforce the Act. The
legislative history of the Act also contemplates that private rights of action properly
could be implied under the Act on behalf of
4

persons who suffer injury as a result of
prohibited corporate bribery."
In a report to Congress on July 1, 1978 the
SEC 6 said—
" . . . Along with prohibiting companies from
engaging in certain corrupt practices with
respect to foreign officials, the Act . . .
require[s] reporting companies to make and
keep accurate books and records and to
establish and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls which meet certain objectives.
"Although rules have not yet been proposed, the Commission is likely to require, . .
. a representation that an issuer's system of
internal accounting controls is in compliance
with the provisions of the Act. This could be
accomplished through a representation from
management that the issuer's system of
internal accounting controls meets the objectives set out in the Act, together with an
opinion of the independent public accountant as to management's representation or
through an opinion, similar to management's
representation described above, from the
issuer's independent public accountant
"Finally, the Commission has pending rule
proposals which would supplement certain of
the provisions of the Act. These rules, if
adopted, would make it unlawful for any
person to falsify corporate books and records
and for any officer, director, or shareholder
of a publicly-owned company to mislead an
accountant in connection with his examination of corporate financial statements. . . ."

Consequences
Penalties for violations of the Accounting
Standards Provisions of the Act are limited to
$10,000 for companies and $10,000 plus 5 years
imprisonment for company officials. Penalties for

violating the corrupt practices provisions (on
influencing foreign governmental decisions) provide for $1,000,000 fines for companies and
$10,000 fines and 5 years imprisonment for
company officials. Further, any fines imposed on
individuals may not be paid directly or indirectly
by the company.
There are of course other implications—
economic, social, and political—but they are not
the burden of this text. Management, however,
must not lose sight of the changing environment
in which business must operate.

U N C E R T A I N RESPONSIBILITIES
That major uncertainties are implicit in the
Accounting Standards Provisions of the Act
comes clear from the following items:
• The SEC brought the first court action in
March 1978, charging that a company
(Aminex) and certain of its officers had violated the Act's Accounting Standards Provisions. Yet no government rules or guidelines
on how the Act should be applied have been
issued. 7 Unless general guidelines are developed, determining whether individuals and
companies have complied with the Act may
have to wait until the provisions of the Act are
applied and interpreted in specific administrative and judicial proceedings of alleged wrongdoing. This could prove a long, tedious and
painful process.
• Internal accounting control objectives under
the Act are excerpted from professional
quidelines prepared by and for auditors in
determining audit scope, and not from information prepared to define the responsibilities
of companies subject to the Act. Just how
should guidance prepared for outside auditors
be interpreted by management in meeting the
requirements of the Act?
• Precedents are not available as to what individual companies are doing about their record

keeping and internal accounting control systems; and each company's uniqueness will
dilute the transferability of its experience to
others.
• The latitude that management has in complying with the Accounting Standards Provisions
of the Act is unclear. For example, in certain
circumstances, management may believe that
changes in personnel will more effectively
enhance control than additional record keeping or internal accounting control systems and
procedures.
• The Act applies to registrants—but what about
subsidiaries that are not registrants? And there
is the much more difficult question of minority
investments in other companies, especially if
accounted for on the equity method (because
the investor may have real influence even
though the ownership interest is minor).
The SEC complaint in the Aminex case does
not allege bribes or illegal or questionable payments, but does allege violations of the Accounting Standards Provisions of the Act because of
fraudulent activities concealed by false entries on
the company's books and records. If this complaint reflects the Commission's intended direction, SEC application of the Act could be extensive.
These uncertainties complicate management's
already difficult job of establishing the limits of its
responsibilities. The role of judgment is central in
determining what practices should be adopted.

NEW M A N A G E M E N T OBJECTIVES
Since the auditor's definition of internal accounting control is used in the Act for defining
the responsibilities of management, its subjectivity and the judgments needed in applying it are
important to an understanding of what may be
required of managment under the Act.
The two broad, interrelated objectives of inter5

nal accounting control are:
• Safeguarding assets against loss
• Producing reliable financial records for internal use and for external reporting purposes. 8
These are elaborated into many more specific
control objectives relating to various assets and
transactions. Systems and procedures should provide controls f o r each o b j e c t i v e on a
cost-effective basis and generally consist of combinations of seven elements:

• Evaluate the systems, giving particular consideration to possible material weaknesses. And
be sure to give special attention to sensitive
transactions even though monetary amounts
are not significant. (For example: unusual
bonuses to employees, unusual credits to customers, and any large disbursements in cash.)
Identify Business Risks and Related Exposures
Each business enterprise is faced with an ever
present set of risks and exposures. Among the
many are:
• Fraud and embezzlement

• Competent, trustworthy personnel with clear
lines of authority and responsibility

• Statutory sanctions

• Adequate segregation of duties

• Excessive costs/deficient revenues

• Proper procedures for authorization

• Loss or destruction of assets

• Adequate documents and records

• Competitive disadvantage

• Proper procedures for record keeping

• Erroneous record keeping

• Physical control over assets and records

• Unacceptable accounting

• Independent
performance.

(yet

internal)

checks

on

For a detailed discussion of the specific control
objectives and each of these seven elements, see
Part II of this booklet.

CAN I N T E R N A L A C C O U N T I N G C O N T R O L
B E R E V I E W E D ? A N D HOW?
The first answer is yes, and it was easy. The
second answer is not so easy. We believe there
are three fundamental steps management must
take:
• Identify business risks and related exposures
based on an understanding of the company's
business and transactions.
• Describe and understand the systems used to
process transactions, safeguard assets, and
produce accounting reports.
<5

• Business interruption
• Erroneous management decisions
In fact, markets may disappear, a lawsuit may
be filed, raw material prices may increase, a plant
may burn down—possibilities are endless. Two of
management's primary responsibilities are to anticipate these risks and to position the company
so that the exposures can be economically
minimized.
In identifying risks and exposures, management
should assume that the Act applies to all controlled subsidiaries included in its consolidated
financial statements. For minority investments
accounted for on the equity method, the investor
should obtain assurance that the investee has
acted to demonstrate compliance with the Act. In
some cases, it may be appropriate simply to have
investee management confirm that they have
taken action to comply with the Act. In other
circumstances the investor may have to take an

actual role in demonstrating compliance.
In allocating resources to specific internal
accounting controls and record keeping procedures, management should prioritize financial and
related exposures by judging their risk of occurrence and possible impact on the company.
Describe and Understand the Systems Used to
Process Transactions
Internal accounting controls are evaluated in
terms of specific types of transactions and assets
and their related specific control objectives. For
example, specific controls should be designed to
assure that raw materials purchased and used are
properly recorded so that inventory accounts are
a reasonably accurate representation of the usable items on hand.
An understanding of internal accounting controls requires a reasonably detailed description of
the various accounting systems. To facilitate
description, transactions are placed in natural
groupings—called transaction cycles. Transaction
cycles are described to show the flow of each type
of transaction through the various functions of
the business. The elements of internal accounting
control (listed under New Management Objectives, and discussed in Part II) should be clearly
displayed; flowcharting is often used for this
purpose.
In addition to maintaining numerous transaction cycles—such as sales and collections, procurements and payments, payroll, and inventory
and warehousing—most companies maintain a
number of "corporate-level" controls. Examples
of such controls are: an audit committee of the
board of directors, internal audit, and a well
defined conflict-of-interest policy. Additional examples are given in Part II. These controls are
particularly important for larger companies; they
enable management to assure that detailed systems are designed, maintained and functioning
properly.
Evaluate the Systems
Do the systems adequately meet their stated

objectives and minimize the exposures identified
by management? If they do, are the system's
costs commensurate with benefits, or can they be
reduced without reducing control? And, if control
is not being accomplished, are the weaknesses
material, separately or in the aggregate? These
are the questions that must be answered in
evaluating systems of internal accounting control.
When auditors evaluate a company's system of
internal accounting control, they look for weaknesses that can make important and not trivial
differences. Our professional definition of a
"material weakness" is:
". . . a condition in which the auditor
believes the prescribed procedures or the
degree of compliance with them does not
provide reasonable assurance that errors or
irregularities in amounts that would be material in the financial statements being audited would be prevented or detected within
a timely period by employees in the normal
c o u r s e of p e r f o r m i n g t h e i r assigned
functions." 9
However, as we have already seen, those
agencies which will enforce the Act may perceive
a material weakness differently, especially where
a possible illegal act is involved.
Nevertheless, the concept of reasonable assurance does apply; the benefits expected to be
derived must always exceed the expected cost of
internal accounting controls. The benefits consist
of reductions in the risk of failing (a) to safeguard
assets and (b) to produce reliable financial records. Although the cost-benefit relationship is the
primary conceptual criterion in designing a system of accounting control, precise measurement
of costs and benefits is rarely possible; evaluation
usually requires estimates and judgments by
management.
Continued Review and Judgment
In addition to evaluating internal accounting
control at a point in time, management is
7

responsible for assuring that the system functions
as intended over time. This means that recorded
accountability must be compared with existing
assets and liabilities at regular intervals. Examples of procedures that can achieve such comparison are reconciliation of cash balances with bank
statements, physical inspection of plant and
equipment, and physical count of inventories. See
Part II for more detail.
While management styles vary, all managements judgmentally identify areas that require
attention and determine the action to be taken.
These judgments—as they relate to attempts to
comply with the Act—will include consideration
of what transactions should be more closely
scrutinized, and what systems or areas require
particular attention.
Interrelating and comparing operating results is
usually the first step; this includes:
1) Comparing actual results to prior and expected performance,
2) Comparing the operating and financial performance statistics with those of similar companies if possible, and
3) Discussing apparent variations with those
knowledgeable about expected or prior performance levels to determine the causes.
Ordinarily, these comparisons are made by
product lines or segments, and concentrate on
identifying and determining the reasons for variations.
Such procedures highlight areas that may require action and can also indicate possible control
or record keeping deficiencies. These approaches
are necessary because the myriad transactions, as
well as the size and complexity of many business
operations, make it impossible for management
to have a continuing working-level involvement
with all areas of the business. In essence, because
there is a limit on the time and money that can be
spent for record keeping and control systems, this
8

approach helps to concentrate resources where
they can do the most good.
Exception identification (isolating areas with
performance different than expected) is often
used, reporting only those items which do not
meet a designated average or normal standard.
This is an expeditious route to areas which may
require additional consideration.
A variance is chosen for additional attention
only when a cause is sought—i.e., when management asks "Why?" Specific studies, reports, or
other analysis may be required, and when a cause
is determined, additional business judgments may
follow:
• Has a change in the business environment
taken place, and is it being appropriately
signalled by the variations?
• Should additional record keeping and systems
controls be required?
• Are other changes, for example, personnel
changes, needed?
If the variation is justified, i.e., it is based on
underlying business or operating conditions, then
no changes need be made in the record keeping
or control systems—they are performing their
functions. In this case, management must determine whether the return on investment continues
to be, or promises to become, acceptable.
If the variation results from deficiencies in the
record keeping or control system, there are two
choices, or a combination of each, namely
whether:
• Actions not related to accounting or record
keeping systems should be taken; or
• Changes should be made in the internal
accounting control and record keeping systems.
Consider a particular fact situation: a retail
shoe store (like many other high-volume, lowunit-cost activities) has significant shrinkage from
errors in billing, mishandling of physical inven-

tories, theft, and/or conversion by employees. For
simplicity, although a combination of approaches
could be appropriate, assume that the decision
weighs two alternatives, namely:
• Increasing the amount of record keeping and
controls; or
• Other changes in operating procedures.
Increasing the amount of record keeping or
controls would require either increased personnel
or changes in the duties of existing personnel and
would be justified only if losses would be reduced
appropriately.
On the other hand, various changes in operating procedures might be made. The decision
could be made that each store would buy its
inventory from the company. The manager would
then be responsible for running the operation at a
tolerable loss level. (Losses can be limited but
only rarely eliminated.) Alternatively, a bonus
system for better-than-average performance
could accomplish the same objectives. All of
these possible changes might achieve the
purpose—bringing losses back into acceptable
limits. Management has to choose the most
effective way to reduce the shortages. In our
hypothetical shoe store, frequent physical inventories and comparisons could show whether the
assets are safeguarded at an acceptable level. It
appears to us that no one of the alternatives is
preferred because of the Act, but some alternative
must be chosen.

W H E R E T H E BUCK STOPS
Four key groups in the company should be
involved in developing a plan to demonstrate
active compliance with the Act—the board of
directors or its audit committee, operating management, internal auditors, and the company's
independent auditors. While assignment of duties
and responsibilities among these groups will vary,
the usual approach is outlined below.

Role of the Board of Directors
The board should be responsible for approving
basic policies and for compliance oversight, not
detailed specification and enforcement. Still, the
primary responsibility for the sufficiency of a
company's measures to comply with the Act lies
here. The board of directors or its audit committee should—
• Understand in broad outline how the record
keeping and internal accounting control systems function and judge their sufficiency to
achieve compliance with the Act.
• Broadly monitor compliance, and suggest revisions as needed.
• Review existing policies and consider changes
needed to comply with the Act; if adequate
policies already exist, consider additional
communication.
• See that appropriate actions are taken concerning possible violations of the Act, if any.
Role of Operating Management
Management's primary responsibility for maintaining adequate and effective record keeping and
internal accounting control systems and for
safeguarding assets is not new. But the Act
focuses attention on these aspects of management's responsibility in a manner that compels
greater attention than may have been true in the
past. In fact, operating management is responsible for detailed implementation and enforcement
to comply with the Act.
The board of directors or its audit committee,
while exercising its oversight responsibilities, will
look to operating management for information
and to take any necessary corrective action.
Accordingly, operating management should—
• Identify the risks that are inherent in the
business and the potential for errors and
irregularities.
• Undertake to systematically document

and
9

evaluate existing record keeping practices and
systems of internal accounting controls
throughout the company to identify instances
of possible nonconformity with a reasonable
interpretation of the Act.
• Identify and articulate the factors considered
in assessing the practicality and cost/benefit
aspects of suggested systems revisions.
• Initiate applicable revisions
policies or directives.

in

corporate

Role of the Internal Auditor
Internal auditors are an important part of
internal control. They can, separately or with
operating management, accomplish most of the
above. In addition, they can:
• Monitor compliance with existing policies of
operating management or the board of directors.
• Assist in special studies for operating management or the board of directors.
Role of the Independent Auditor
The independent auditor is not part of a
company's internal accounting control system. He
has a unique objective—to form an opinion on
the financial statements. This objective causes the
independent auditor to plan that examination to
search for errors or irregularities that would have
a material effect in the financial statements and to
use due skill and care in the conduct of the
examination.
The adoption of the Act does not change the
way an independent auditor goes about determining the scope of his examination. After a preliminary review of a company's internal accounting
control systems, the auditor must decide the
extent to which he will rely on the systems for his
purposes. The auditor may decide that it is both
feasible and cost effective to extensively test the
internal accounting control systems and place
major reliance thereon in formulating an opinion
on the amounts in the financial statements. On
10

the other hand, he may decide that it is more
effective to perform direct extensive tests of
documentation underlying the amounts in the
financial statements, rather than relying on the
internal accounting control system. In most cases,
he will decide on a combination of reliance and
direct testing. Accordingly, weaknesses that exist
in a company's record keeping and internal
accounting control systems, or portions thereof,
may not be detected during the course of the
independent auditor's examination because for
valid reasons he has chosen not to rely on such
systems.
Currently, if aware of material weakness in
internal accounting control, errors or irregularities, or illegal acts, the independent auditor is required to communicate them to
management (at least one level above those
involved). Depending on the significance of the
matters reported, the board or its audit committee may also be advised.
The independent auditor's responsibility for
evaluating effectiveness and monitoring compliance of internal accounting control systems
parallels the responsibility of the board and its
audit committee. The independent auditor is in a
unique position in that he can make a "hands on"
evaluation of the system, an opportunity not
readily available to the board or the audit
committee. In addition, the independent auditor
brings the experience of similar association with
systems of other companies to the evaluation and
judgment problem. As a result, the independent
auditor has a unique perspective on the company, and the board of directors and audit
committee may find the outside auditor especially
helpful in fulfilling their policy and oversight
duties. In fact, the independent public accountant
can assist managment in demonstrating compliance with the Act by:
• Recommending plans for the systematic review, documentation, and evaluation of internal controls

• Providing instructional manuals on methods
and techniques for describing, testing and
evaluating internal controls
• Conducting training programs for internal auditors and other company personnel selected
to review internal controls
• Evaluating the efforts of company personnel
reviewing internal controls
• Recommending changes in internal controls to
overcome identified deficiencies.

CONCLUSION
In essence, the Accounting Standards Provision
of the Act became effective when it was signed
into law on December 19, 1977. No period for
transition or adjustment is specified in the law.
Companies that are affected can assume that no
action is required since management has always
been concerned with the adequacy of record
keeping and systems of internal accounting control. However, we doubt that this is a prudent
course of action. Instead we recommend a systematic and documented effort to review the
adequacy of record keeping and internal controls
and to make any improvements that business
judgment dictates advisable. We see two benefits:
evidence of compliance with the Act if challenged, and significant improvements in operations and control.
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Part II

The Specifics of Compliance

This part, dealing with the specifics of compliance, is adapted from Touche Ross internal
manuals to develop the concepts of corporate
controls—their objectives, the potential for errors
and irregularities, and how controls can be
reviewed and evaluated. The main topics discussed are
• Elements of internal accounting control
• Levels of controls
• Approach to evaluating controls
• Reviewing controls
• Limitations of internal controls.
E L E M E N T S OF I N T E R N A L A C C O U N T I N G
CONTROL
It is necessary that a system have certain
elements or characteristics if the two broad
objectives of internal accounting control, and the
many detailed objectives they require, are to be
fulfilled. There are seven such elements, as
presented below.
Competent, Trustworthy Personnel with Clear
Lines of Authority and Responsibility
The most important element of any system of
internal control is personnel. If employees are
competent and trustworthy, some of the other
elements can be absent and reliable financial
statements can still result. Honest, efficient people are able to perform at a high level even when
there are few other controls to support them. On
12

the other hand, even if the other six elements of
control are strong, incompetent or dishonest
people can reduce the system to a shambles.
Still, the employment of competent and trustworthy personnel is not by itself sufficient to meet
the objectives of internal accounting control.
People have a number of innate shortcomings
due to their highly complex nature. They can, for
example, become bored or dissatisfied; personal
problems can disrupt their performance, or their
goals may change. Consequently, it is important
to make a judgment of the competence and
integrity of employees, even though it is difficult
to do, and to use this as a part of the total
evaluation of the system. The evaluation of
employees will result from observations, inquiries
and review of their work.
Specific responsibility for the performance of
duties must be assigned to specific individuals if
the system is to operate effectively and work is to
be properly performed. If a duty is not adequately performed, it is then possible to place
responsibility with the person who did the work.
The one assigned is thus motivated to work
carefully, and corrective action by management is
made possible.
Adequate Segregation of Duties
There are four general types of segregation of
duties for the prevention of both intentional and
unintentional errors that are of special significance. These are discussed below.
1. Separation

of operational

responsibility

from

financial record keeping responsibility. If each
department or division in an organization was
responsible for preparing its own records and
reports, there would be a tendency to bias the
results to improve its reported performance. In
order to ensure unbiased information, financial
record keeping is typically included in a separate
department under the controllership function.
(This need not necessarily be the case for
non-financial reports; for example, sales demography reports may properly be maintained by the
sales department.)
2. Separation of the custody of assets from
accounting. The reason for not permitting the
person who has temporary or permanent custody
of an asset to account for that asset is to protect
the firm against defalcation. When one person
performs both functions, there is an excessive risk
of his or her disposing of the asset for personal
gain and adjusting the records to eliminate
responsibility for the asset. If the cashier, for
example, receives cash and maintains both the
cash and accounts receivable records, it might be
possible to take the cash received from a customer and adjust the customer's account by
failing to record a sale or by recording a fictitious
credit to the account. Other examples of inadequate segregation of the custodial function include the distribution of payroll checks by a
payroll clerk who might be in a position to
initiate a false employee on the payroll and keep
the check for personal gain, and the maintenance
of inventory records by storeroom personnel who
might be able to sell items for personal gain and
cover up the theft.
In an E D P system, any person with custody of
assets should be prevented from performing the
programming or operating function, and be denied access to punched cards or other input
records. As a general rule it is desirable that any
person performing an accounting function,
whether it be in an E D P or in a manual system,
be denied access to assets that can be converted
to personal gain.

3. Separation of the authorization of transactions
from the custody of related assets. It is desirable,
to the extent that it is possible, to prevent persons
who authorize transactions from having control
over the related asset. For example, the same
person should not authorize the payment of a
vendor's invoice and also sign the check in
payment of the bill. Similarly, the authority for
adding newly hired employees to the payroll or
eliminating those who have terminated employment should be performed by someone other
than the person responsible for distributing
checks to the employees. Nor should anyone who
handles incoming cash receipts have the authority
to determine which accounts should be charged
off as uncollectible. As illustrated, the authorization of a transaction and the handling of the
related asset by the same person increases the
possibility of fraud within the organization.
4. Separation of duties within the accounting
function. The least desirable accounting system is
one in which one employee is responsible for
recording a transaction from its origin to its
ultimate posting in the general ledger. This
enhances the likelihood that unintentional errors
will remain undetected.
There are many opportunities for automatic
cross-checking of different employees' work in a
manual system by simply segregating the recording in journals from the recording in related
subsidiary ledgers. It is also possible to segregate
the responsibility for recording in related journals, such as the sales and cash receipts journals.
In most cases adequate segregation of accounting
duties, where each person performs his work
independently, substantially increases control
over errors without any duplication of effort.
In an E D P system, segregation of duties is of a
different nature than in manual systems, but it is
of equal importance. Because the need for
frequent cross-checking is unnecessary due to the
computer's ability to perform consistently and
uniformly, the segregation of duties within the
E D P operation puts greater emphasis on control
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over lost records, improper programming, and
fraudulent transactions. For these reasons, the
responsibility for processing of data by computer
operators, for custody of transaction and library
files, and for programming should be separated.
The overall organization structure of a business
must provide proper segregation of duties, yet
still promote operational efficiency and effective
communication.
Proper Procedures for Authorization
Every transaction must be properly authorized
if control is to be satisfactory. If any person in an
organization could acquire or expend assets at
will, complete chaos would result.
Authorization can be either general or specific.
In performing its function of general authorization, management establishes policies for the
organization to follow. Subordinates are instructed to implement these general authorizations by approving all transactions within the
limits set by the policy. Examples of general
authority are the issuance of fixed price lists for
the sale of products, credit limits for customers,
and fixed automatic reorder points for making
purchases.
Specific authority has to do with individual
transactions. For some transactions, management
is unwilling to establish a general policy of
authorization. Instead, it prefers to make authorizations on a case-by-case basis. An example is
the authorization of a sales transaction by the
sales manager for a used car company.
The individual or group who can grant either
specific or general authority for transactions
should hold a position commensurate with the
nature and significance of the transactions, and
the policy for such authority should be established by top management. For example, a
common policy is to have all acquisitions of
capital assets over a set amount authorized by the
board of directors.
Approval of a transaction should be distinguished from authorization. Approval is only an
indication that the conditions required by au14

thorization have apparently been met. For example, the initials of approval on a vendor's invoice
may be intended to mean that the goods being
paid for were ordered and received by the
company; however, it is possible that they were in
fact not, and that the approval and initialling
were perfunctory. Because of this, it is often
necessary to look beyond approval to other
evidence of authorization when knowledge of the
system and/or circumstances cause doubts about
the effectiveness of the approval process.
Adequate Documents and Records
Documents and records are the physical objects upon which transactions are entered and
summarized. They include such diverse items as
sales invoices, purchase orders, subsidiary ledgers
sales journals, time cards, and bank reconciliations; and they may be in either "hard-copy"
form or in the form of machine readable media.
Both documents of original entry and records
upon which transactions are entered are important elements of a system, but the inadequacy of
documents normally causes greater control problems.
Documents perform the function of transmitting information throughout the organization and
between different organizations. The documents
must be adequate to provide reasonable assurance that all assets are properly controlled and all
transactions correctly recorded. For example, if
the receiving department fills out a receiving
report when material is obtained, the accounts
payable department can verify the quantity and
description on the vendor's invoice by comparing
it with the information on the receiving report.
Certain relevant principles dictate the proper
design and use of documents and records. Documents and records should be:
a) Sufficiently simple to make sure that they are
clearly understood.
b) Designed for multiple uses whenever possible,
to minimize the number of different forms.

For example, a properly designed and used
sales invoice can be the basis for recording
sales in the journals, the authority for shipment, the basis for developing sales statistics,
and the support for salesmen's commissions.
c) Constructed in a manner that encourages
correct preparation. This can be done by
providing a degree of internal check within the
form or record. For example, a document
might include instructions for proper routing,
blank spaces for authorizations and approvals,
and designated column spaces for numerical
data. These help assure proper inclusion of all
required information.
d) Prenumbered consecutively to facilitate control over missing documents, and as an aid in
locating documents when they are needed at a
later date.
e) Prepared at the time a transaction takes place,
or as soon thereafter as possible. When there
is a longer time interval, records are less
credible and the chance for error is increased.
A control closely related to documents and
records is the chart of accounts, which classifies
transactions into individual balance sheet and
income statement accounts. The chart of accounts
is an important control because it provides the
framework for determining the information presented to management and other financial statement users. It must contain sufficient information
to permit the presentation of financial statements
in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles, but in addition the classification of the
information should help management make decisions. Information by divisions, product lines,
responsibility centers, and similar breakdowns
should be provided for. The chart of accounts is
helpful in preventing misclassification errors if it
accurately and precisely describes which type of
transactions should be in each account. It is
especially important that the descriptions clearly
distinguish between capital assets, inventories,

and expense items, since these are the major
categories of concern to external users of the
financial statements.
Proper Procedures for Record Keeping
If the financial statements are to properly
reflect the actual transactions during the period,
there must be procedures to assure the proper
recording of all transactions. This aspect of
control is especially significant because it relates
directly to the objective of providing reliable
data. Like many of the elements of control, this
one is closely related to each of the others. If the
other elements of control are proper, the likelihood of having adequate record keeping is
enhanced. For example, the presence of competent, trustworthy personnel with well-defined
responsibilities for keeping the records, but without access to assets, greatly increases the likelihood of proper record keeping. Similarly, the
existence of adequate documents and records and
adequate internal verification is also beneficial in
providing adequate record keeping.
The procedures for proper record keeping
should be spelled out in procedures manuals to
encourage consistent application. The manuals
should define the flow of documents throughout
the organization and should provide for sufficient
information to facilitate adequate record keeping
and the maintenance of proper control over
assets. For example, to assure the proper recording of the purchase of raw materials, a copy of
the purchase order for acquiring the merchandise
and a copy of the receiving report when the raw
materials are received should be sent to accounts
payable. This procedure aids in properly recording purchases in the accounts payable journal,
and it facilitates the determination of whether the
vendor's invoice from the supplier should be
paid. If both purchase orders and receiving
reports are prenumbered, the accounts payable
clerk can account for the numerical sequence of
these documents as a means of determining
whether all purchases have been recorded.
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Physical Control Over Assets and Records
The most important type of protective measure
for safeguarding assets and records is the use of
physical precautions. An example is the use of
storerooms for inventory to guard against pilferage. When the storeroom is under the control of
a competent employee, there is also further
assurance that obsolescence is minimized. Fireproof safes and safety deposit vaults for the
protection of assets such as currency and securities are other important physical safeguards.
Physical safeguards are also necessary for
records and documents. The redevelopment of
lost or destroyed records is costly and time
consuming. Imagine what would happen if an
accounts receivable master file were destroyed.
The considerable cost of backup records and
other controls can be justified to prevent this loss.
Similarly, such documents as insurance policies
and notes receivable should be physically protected.
Mechanical and electronic protective devices
can also be used to obtain additional assurance
that accounting information is current and accurately recorded. Cash registers and certain types
of automatic data-processing equipment are all
potentially useful additions to the system of
internal control for this purpose.
Independent Checks on Performance
(Internal Verification)
The last specific element of control is the
careful and continuous review of the other six
elements in the system. The need for a system of
internal checks arises for at least three reasons:
first, a system tends to change over time unless
there is a mechanism for frequent review. Personnel are likely to forget procedures, become
careless, or intentionally fail to follow them
unless someone is there to observe and evaluate
their performance. Second, both fraudulent and
unintentional errors are always possible, regardless of the quality of the controls. And third,
there is a need to periodically compare recorded
accountability with physical assets in order to
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assure that they are properly safeguarded, and to
determine the existence of possibly unrecorded or
improperly recorded transactions.
An essential characteristic of the persons performing internal verification procedures is
independence from the individuals originally responsible for preparing the data. A considerable
portion of the value of checks on performance is
lost when the individual doing the verification is a
subordinate of the person originally responsible
for preparing the data, or lacks independence in
some other way.
The least expensive m e a n s of i n t e r n a l
verification is the separation of duties in the
manner previously discussed. For example, when
the accounts receivable subsidiary records, the
sales journal, and the general ledger are maintained by different people, each of them automatically verifies a part of the work of the others.
Similarly, when the bank reconciliation is performed by a person independent of the accounting records and handling of cash, there is an
opportunity for verification without incurring
significant additional costs.
Some important types of verification can only
be accomplished by a duplication of effort. For
example, the counting of inventory by two
different teams to make certain that the count is
correct is costly, but frequently necessary.
Another example is the use of a keypunch verifier
in an E D P system. In this control procedure a
second person keypunches the same information
as was originally keypunched, and the results of
these two independent activities are automatically
compared for differences. Even though the cost
of performing the same work more than once
may seem excessive, it is sometimes the only
practical way of ensuring accurate and reliable
results.
The existence of an internal audit staff is usually
a highly effective method of verifying the proper
recording of financial information. If the internal
audit staff is independent of both the operating
and the accounting departments, and if it reports
directly to top management or the audit commit-

tee of the board of directors, there is an excellent
opportunity for extensive verification within the
organization.
It is important to understand that the above
elements of control are complementary and
should not be thought of as alternatives. Any one
control will have advantages and disadvantages
when compared with other controls. An effective
accounting system will utilize a mix of controls
designed to compensate for the particular disadvantages of individual controls.

LEVELS O F CONTROLS
The concept of internal control includes all the
control systems in an enterprise that affect assets
and/or financial data. Because internal control is
designed to help achieve pre-determined objectives, these will include the planning processes as
well as the various detailed control systems.
The planning and control systems of an enterprise can be segregated into three levels:
a) Strategic planning
b) Management planning and control
c) Operational control.

Strategic planning relates to the long-term
planning process of the enterprise. Strategic
planning decisions determine the objectives of
the enterprise and the nature of its business.
Management planning and control involves the
short-term planning and control cycle used to
accomplish the enterprise's objectives. For example, management control functions would include
setting yearly budgets and monitoring performance against budgets.
Operational control is the function of assuring
that day-to-day routine activities are performed
effectively and efficiently. Operational controls
can be viewed at two levels: systems-level controls and corporate-level controls. Systems-level
controls relate to processing transactions by
general classification (e.g., sales, cash receipts,
cash disbursements). Corporate-level controls cut
across all systems to assure that the systems are
maintained. These include such things as internal
audit and the chart of accounts. Corporate-level
controls are in effect "controls on controls" and
greatly facilitate both the effectiveness of the
systems and the monitoring by management.
The following examples are given to illustrate
the difference between these planning and control
levels and to give examples of the types of
activity that might be carried out at each level:

LEVELS O F P L A N N I N G A N D C O N T R O L
Strategic

Planning

Management

Control

Operational

Control

Long-range planning —»

Formulating profit plans —>

Recording transactions

Organizational structure —>

Planning staff levels —>

Hiring policies

Deciding marketing
policies —

Formulating advertising
programs —>

Controlling placement
of advertisments

Deciding financial
policies —>

Working capital
planning

Controlling credit
extension

Deciding production
policies —»

Selecting product
improvements —»

Scheduling production
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It is important to clearly understand these
three levels of planning and control, and their
interrelationship, because they will form the basis
for understanding within a particular company
the controls present in the accounting systems.
When a system is described and analyzed, this
is generally done by dividing it into major
transaction cycles, with controls which affect all
transactions being classified as corporate-level
controls. This procedure can be illustrated using
the following transaction cycles which are common to most commercial and manufacturing
companies:
—Sales and collections
—Procurement and payment
—Payroll
—Inventory and warehousing
Among the controls normally considered to be
in the corporate-level category, are the following:
—An audit committee of the board of directors
(most commonly for publicly held companies)
—The aspects of organizational structure which
relate to organizational units, rather than
specific systems
—Monthly financial statements
—Internal audit
—Procedural manuals
—The chart of accounts

A P P R O A C H TO E V A L U A T I N G CONTROLS
Notwithstanding the need to understand controls at all levels, the greatest portion of time in
the typical review of internal controls is spent
analyzing and evaluating the detailed controls
intended to meet the broad objectives of
safeguarding assets and assuring the reliability of
accounting information.
Objectives
Within specific accounting subsystems (i.e.,
transaction cycles) elements of control are designed and related so as to prevent and/or detect
seven general classes of errors, or stated alternatively, to achieve seven internal control objectives. These are more specific than those defined
in the definition of internal accounting control
and serve as a framework in evaluating internal
controls. The seven objectives for any given
transaction type together with examples of the
types of errors for each objective, are given
below:
Recorded Transactions are Valid. This objective
deals with the possibility of invalid transactions
being included in the records. Instances include
the recording of a sale when no shipment took
place, or a charge-off of an uncollectible account
that has actually been paid.
Transactions are Properly Authorized.
If a
transaction takes place without proper authorization at the key points, an improper transaction
may have occurred. Examples of transactions
without proper authorization include the failure
to authorize shipments and the acceptance of
unauthorized sales returns and allowances.

—Bonding of employees in a position of trust
—A mandatory vacation policy
—A well defined conflict-of-interest policy and
monitoring system
—Reasonable record retention policies in accordance with state and federal laws.
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Existing Transactions are Recorded. An error
under this objective occurs whenever there is a
failure to record a transaction. This objective is
the counterpart of the validity of the recorded
transactions objective inasmuch as it deals with
valid transactions not being recorded rather than
recorded transactions not being valid. One exam-

ple is the shipment of goods without billing or
inclusion in the accounting records. Less obvious
examples are the recording of an increase in the
allowance for doubtful accounts or reserve for
inventory obsolescence when the respective asset
values become impaired. Although these are not
"transactions" in the strict sense, and are often
viewed as separate from the processing of traditional types of recurring events (conventional
transactions), they are recorded nonetheless, are
subject to errors, and must be properly controlled.
Transactions are Properly Valued. Even though
all transactions are included in the records and
are authorized and valid, they may be stated at an
incorrect amount. For the financial statements to
be fairly stated, the individual transactions must
be recorded at the correct amount. As an
illustration, the quantities, prices, extensions, and
footings on sales invoices must be correctly stated
to meet this objective.
Transactions are Properly Classified. This objective deals with the possibility of a transaction
in the cycle being classified improperly. Examples
of misclassifications include the recording of the
purchase of a fixed asset as an expense, the
recording of the receipt of loan proceeds as a
collection of an outstanding account receivable,
and the recording of a collection of an account
receivable as a cash sale.
Transactions Are Recorded at the Proper Time.
In addition to being correctly recorded, transactions must be recorded in the proper reporting
period. Failure to do so is referred to as a cutoff
error, and can result in either an understatement
or overstatement of the affected accounts. The
failure to record transactions on a timely basis
can also result in the complete omission of the
recording due to the loss or mishandling of the
records. It is important, therefore, to record
transactions resonably soon after they occur.
Transactions

sidiary Records and Correctly Summarized. Since
the individual transactions are the source of the
balances in the financial statements, they must be
correctly posted to subsidiary records, the general
ledger, and other reports and those must be
correctly summarized. A defalcation can be covered up in sales by underfooting the sales journal
or posting the amounts in the journal to the
general ledger incorrectly. An example of unintentional error would be recording an amount
owed the company in the wrong customer account.

REVIEWING CONTROLS
Once a good description of a system of controls
has been developed, the review can be performed
in the following manner:
a) Identifying the types of transactions processed
by the system.
b) Identifying the types of errors that could
occur for each transaction type using the
seven general objectives/error types as a
guide.
c) Tracing through the system description to
identify:
(1) Those controls (elements or sets of elements) existing in the system which
should prevent or detect and correct each
type of error. These represent strengths in
the system.
(2) Those types of errors for which no
effective controls exist in the system.
These represent system weaknesses.
As a general guide, the seven objectives/error
types and the common elements of control used
to deal with them are presented in the following
form.

are Properly Posted to the Sub19

R E V I E W I N G CONTROLS
Internal Control
Objective/Error
Type
Recorded transactions are valid/invalid

Common Elements of Control
(Not All Inclusive)
•
•
•
•

Transactions are properly authorized/not
authorized

•

Existing transactions are recorded/not
recorded

•

Transactions are properly/improperly
valued

•

Segregation of duties
Use of prenumbered documents which are
accounted for
Cancellation of documents to prevent reuse
Monthly reconciliation of subsidiary records and
follow-up by an independent person.

Policy on specific or general authorization at key
points (e.g., granting credit)
• Procedures for approvals consistent with policy and
requiring documentation (e.g., attaching signatures or supporting documents).

Use of prenumbered documents which are accounted for
• Segregation of duties
• Monthly reconciliation of subsidiary records and
follow-up by an independent person.

•

Internal verification of details and calculations and
posting by an independent person
Reconciliation of details to control totals (e.g., bank
reconciliation) by an independent person.

Transactions are properly/improperly
classified

•
•

Use of an adequate chart of accounts
Internal review and verification.

Transactions are recorded at the
proper/improper time

•

Procedures to assure prompt recording of all transactions
Internal verification.

•
Transactions are properly/improperly
included in the subsidiary records
and correctly/incorrectly summarized

• Segregation of duties
• Monthly reconciliation of subsidiary records by an
independent person
• Internal verification.

Prevention vs. Detection Controls
In addition to considering controls in terms of
levels in relation to corporate planning, and in
terms of the elements comprising control, it is
useful to categorize controls in other ways. In
designing controls, particularly in the E D P area
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for example, controls are often segregated into
two broad classifications: "prevention controls,"
whose objective is to prevent errors from occurring, and "detection controls," whose objective is
to detect errors that have occurred and assure
their correction on a timely basis.

• Prevention controls are advantageous in that
they are often highly cost effective. They are
"built-in" as part of the system unrelated to the
volume of transactions. Since they prevent errors,
when they are functioning effectively, they avoid
the cost of correcting errors, which can be quite
high. Control elements which are generally preventive in nature are trustworthy personnel,
segregation of duties (to prevent intentional
errors), proper authorization, adequate documents and records, proper record keeping procedures, and physical controls over assets.
• Detection controls, while more costly than
prevention controls are nonetheless necessary.
One reason is that they measure the efficiency of
prevention controls. Secondly, there are certain
types of errors which cannot be controlled preventively in a cost-effective manner. In order to
be effective, detection controls must include
procedures to assure timely correction of the
errors that are detected.
Detection controls include record keeping procedures and independent checks on performance,
often through segregation of duties. Whereas
prevention controls may not always be noticeable
because of their built-in nature, detection controls are generally obvious to those involved with
them. However at the management level, some
controls may exist which act as detection controls
although they may not specifically be designed as
such. For example, although management's review of monthly financial statements will usually
be directed toward an analysis of variances from
budget and the identification of the necessary
corrective action, the investigation of variances
will usually detect errors in the recorded results,
since management will want to determine the
cause of the apparent variance before attempting
to correct the situation. Another example is that
of a division manager who is held accountable
through a responsibility accounting system designed to charge only variable (and, therefore,
controllable) costs to his division. The manager's
primary objective in reviewing divisional account-

ing reports may be directed to cost control, but
an important by-product will usually be the
detection of accounting errors. Other examples of
these controls are:
—Reconciliation
statement.

of cash balances with

bank

—Confirmation of bank balances using a standard confirmation, which would request information concerning loans and liens on assets to
determine whether any off-the-book amounts
or unrecorded liens on assets exist. This step
attempts to address the prohibition against
funds carried off-the-books. Management
should recognize, in the attempts to comply
with the Act, that funds can be raised by
pledges of assets.
—Physical count of major cash funds.
—Inspection
securities.

or

confirmation

of

marketable

—Reconciliation of income received f r o m
marketable securities to published sources.
—Reconciliation of accounts receivable details to
accounts receivable controls.
—Review of accounts receivable
determine collectibility.

agings

to

—Physical counts of inventories and analyses of
variances.
—Physical inspection of plant and equipment.
—Review of underlying records of investees to
establish the appropriate carrying amount.
—Confirmation
payable.

with

vendors

of

accounts

These examples serve to illustrate that although the management process will usually be
designed primarily to help achieve the objectives
of the enterprise, it may also have an important
influence on the reliability of the financial information.
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LIMITATIONS O F I N T E R N A L C O N T R O L
Although reliance on internal control is essential in the operation of a business, complete
reliance on internal control to the exclusion of
special independent checks by internal auditors
and external auditors particularly with respect to
material amounts in the financial statements is
unwise for three primary reasons.
First, control systems are designed to provide
reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that the
objectives of good internal accounting control
will be accomplished. The concept of reasonable
assurance recognizes that the cost of internal
control should not exceed the benefits expected
to be derived. Thus, systems will seldom exist
which can "guarantee" that all errors will be
prevented or detected and corrected on a timely
basis.
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Second, there are inherent limitations in the
performance of many control procedures which
preclude absolute reliance. These include possibilities for errors arising from such causes as
misunderstanding of instructions, mistakes of
judgment, and personal carelessness, distraction
or fatigue. Procedures whose effectiveness depends on segregation of duties can be circumvented by collusion. And procedures whose objective is to assure the execution and recording of
transactions in accordance with management's
authorization may be ineffective against acts by
management itself.
Finally, any projection of internal accounting
control to future periods is subject to the risk that
the procedures may become inadequate because
of changes in conditions and that the degree of
compliance with the procedures may deteriorate.

Appendix

A

Excerpts from Conference Report
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
including Title I of the law, P.L. 95-213

Appendix

B

Excerpts from Senate Report 114,
Foreign Corrupt Practices And Foreign
Investment Disclosure Acts of 1977

T O U C H E ROSS

Appendix

A
Excerpts from Conference Report
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
including Title I of the law, P.L. 95-213
95th CONGRESS ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Report
1st Session
} No. 95-831

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES

DECEMBer 6, 1977.—Ordered to be printed

Mr.

from the committee of conference,
submitted the following

STAGGERS,

CONFERENCE REPORT
[To accompany S. 806]

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two
Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 305) to amend
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers of securities
registered pursuant to section 12 of such Act to maintain accurate
records, to prohibit certain bribes, and for other purposes, having
met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do
recommend to their respective Houses as follows:
That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of
the House to the text of the bill and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:
In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment insert the following:
TITLE

I—FOREIGN

CORRUPT

SHORT

PRACTICES

TITLE

SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the "Foreign Corrupt
Act of 1977".
ACCOUNTING

Practices

STANDARDS

Sec. 102. Section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(16 U.S.C. 78q(b)) is amended by inserting "(1)" after "(b)" and
by adding at the end thereof the following:
" (2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant
to section 12 of this title and every issuer which is required to file
reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title shall—
"(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and
" ( B ) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that—
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"(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific authorization;
"(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary ( I ) to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria
applicable to such statements, and ( I I ) to maintain accountability for assets;
"(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance
with management's general or specific authorization; and
"(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared
with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
"(3) (A) With respect to matters concerning the national security
of the United States, no duty or liability under paragraph (2) of
this subsection shall be imposed upon any person acting in cooperation with the head of any Federal department or agency responsible
for such matters if such act in cooperation with such head of a department or agency was done upon the specific, written directive of the
head of such department or agency pursuant to Presidential authority
to issue such directives. Each directive issued under this paragraph
shall set forth the specific facts and circumstances with respect to
which the provisions of this paragraph are to be invoiced. Each such
directive shall, unless renewed in writing, expire one year after the date
of issuance.
"(B) Each head of a Federal department or agency of the United
States who issues a directive pursuant to this paragraph shall maintain a complete file of all such directives and shall, on October 1 of
each year, transmit a summary of matters covered by such directives
in force at any time during the previous year to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate".
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES BY

ISSUERS

SEC. 103. (a) The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended
by inserting after section 30 the following new section:
"FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES

BY

ISSUERS

"SEC. 30A. (a) It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class
of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or which is
required to file reports under section 15(d) of this title, or for any
officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder
thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization
of the giving of anything of value to—
" (1) any foreign official for purposes of—
" (A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official
in his official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform
his official functions; or
"(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with
a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
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Appendix

A

in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for
or with, or directing business to, any person;
"(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office for purposes of—
"(A) influencing any act or decision of such party, official,
or candidate in its or his official capacity, including a decision
to fail to perform its or his official functions; or
"(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or
his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for
or with, or directing business to, any person; or
"(3) any person, while knowing or having reason to know that
all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered,
given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official,
to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of—
"(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official,
political party, party official, or candidate in his or its official
capacity, including a decision to fail to perform his or its
official functions; or
"(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party
official, or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence
any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business
for or with, or directing business to, any person.
"(b) As used in this section, the term 'foreign official' means any
officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of such government or department, agency,
or instrumentality. Such term does not include any employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.".
(b) (1) Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78ff(a)) is amended by inserting "(other than section 30A)"
immediately after "title" the first place it appears.
(2) Section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78ff) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
"(c)(1) Any issuer which violates section 30A (a) of this title shall,
upon conviction, be fined not more than $1,000,000.
" (2) Any officer or director of an issuer, or any stockholder acting
on behalf of such issuer, who willfully violates section 30A (a) of this
title shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
"(3) Whenever an issuer is found to have violated section 30A (a)
of this title, any employee or agent of such issuer who is a United
States citizen, national, or resident or is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (other than am, officer, director, or stockholder of such issuer), and who willfully carried out the act or practice constituting such violation shall, upon conviction, be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
"(4) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) of this
subsection upon any officer, director, stockholder, employee, or agent
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of an issuer, such fine shall not be paid, directly or indirectly, by such
issuer".
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES

BY DOMESTIC

CONCERNS

SEC. 104. (a) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other
than an issuer which is subject to section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 193b, or amy officer, director, employee, or agent of such
domestic concern or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such
domestic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving
of anything of value to—
(1) any foreign official for purposes of—
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official
in his official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform
his official functions; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with
a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person;
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office for purposes of—
(A) influencing any act or decision of such party, official,
or candidate in its or his official capacity, including a decision
to fail to perform its or his official functions; or
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or
his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person; or
(3) any person, while knowing or having reason to know that
all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered,
given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official,
to any foreign politicial party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office, for purposes of—
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official,
political party, party official, or candidate in his or its official
capacity, including a decision to fail to perform his or its
official functions; or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party
official, or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence
any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.
(b) (1) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any domestic
concern which violates subsection (a) shall, upon conviction, be fined
not more than $1,000,000.
(B) Any individual who is a domestic concern and who willfully
violates subsection (a) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(2) Any officer or director of a domestic concern, or stockholder
acting on behalf of such domestic concern, who willfully violates sub27

section (a) shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(3) Whenever a domestic concern is found to have violated subsection (a) of this section, any employee or agent of such domestic concern
who is a United States citizen, national, or resident or is otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (other than an officer,
director, or stockholder acting on behalf of such domestic concern),
and who willfully carried out the act or practice constituting such
violation shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(4) Whenever a fine is imposed under paragraph (2) or (3) of this
subsection upon any officer, director, stockholder, employee, or agent
of a domestic concern, such fine shall not be paid, directly or indirectly,
by such domestic concern.
(c) Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that any domestic
concern, or officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder thereof, is
engaged, or is about to engage, in any act or practice constituting a
violation of subsection (a) of this section, the Attorney General may,
in his discretion, bring a civil action in an appropriate district court
of the United States to enjoin such act or practice, and upon a proper
showing a permanent or temporary injunction or a temporary restraining order shall be granted without bond.
(d) As used in this section:
(1) The term "domestic concern" means (A) any individual
who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or (B)
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship, which has its principal place of business in the United States,
or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United
States or a territory, possession, or common/wealth of the United
States.
(2) The term "foreign official" means any officer or employee of
a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on
behalf of (my such government or department, agency, or instrumentality. Such term does not include any employee of a, foreign
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof
whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.
(3) The term "interstate commerce" means trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State or between any State
and any place or ship outside thereof. Such term includes the
intrastate use of (A) a telephone or other interstate means of
communication, or (B) any other interstate
instrumentality.

J O I N T E X P L A N A T O R Y STATEMENT OF T H E
COMMITTEE O F CONFERENCE
The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments
of the House to the bill (S. 305) to amend the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 to require issuers of securities registered pursuant to section
12 of such Act to maintain accurate records, to prohibit certain bribes,
and for other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the
House and the Senate in explanation of the effect of the action agreed
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upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report:
The House amendment to the text of the bill struck out all of the
Senate bill after the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text.
The Senate recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of the
House with an amendment which is a substitute for the Senate bill and
the House amendment. The differences between the Senate bill, the
House amendment, and the substitute agreed to in conference are noted
below, except for clerical corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and
clarifying changes.
TABLE OF CONTENTS OF JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON CONFERENCE

A. Corporate bribery of foreign officials:
1. Title of the Act.
2. Accounting:
a. Integrity of accounting records and reports.
b. Systems of accounting controls.
c. Prohibition on falsification of books and records; false statements to accountants.
d. National security.
3. Payments to officials:
a. Prohibition against certain payments to foreign officials by
issuers subject to SEC jurisdiction.
1. Definitions.
2. Penalties.
b. Prohibition against certain payments to foreign officials by
domestic concerns:
1. Definitions.
2. Department of Justice injunctive power.
B. Disclosure.
A.

CORPORATE B R I B E R Y

OF F O R E I G N

OFFICIALS

1 . TITLE OF T H E ACT—FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

The Senate bill established the title of Title I of the Act as the
"Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977".
The House amendment established the title of the Act as the "Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977".
The House receded to the Senate.
2.

ACCOUNTING

a. Integrity of accounting records and reports
The Senate bill contained a provision which required issuers subject
to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") to make and keep books, records, and accounts which accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets
of the issuer.
The House amendment contained no provision.
The House receded to the Senate with an amendment requiring such
books, records and accounts to be made and maintained accurately and
fairly "in reasonable detail". The conference committee adopted the
"in reasonable detail" qualification to the accurate and fair requirement in light of the concern that such a standard, if unqualified, might
connote a degree of exactitude and precision which is unrealistic. The
amendment makes clear that the issuer's records should reflect trans29

actions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic
events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments
of bribes.
b. Systems of accounting controls
The Senate bill contained a provision requiring issuers to devise and
maintain adequate systems of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that, among other things, transactions
are recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for assets.
The House amendment contained no provision.
The House receded to the Senate with an amendment deleting the
word "adequate". Since the precise requirements of the system of
internal accounting controls to be maintained by the issuer are set
forth in specific terms in the statute, the term adequate was deemed
superfluous.
c. Prohibition on falsification of books and records; false statements
to accountants
The Senate bill contained provisions to make it unlawful for (1)
any person knowingly to falsify any book, record, or account required
to be made for any accounting purpose, and (2) any person knowingly
to make a materially false or misleading statement or to omit to state
or cause another person to omit any material fact necessary in order
to make statements to an accountant not misleading.
The House amendment contained no comparable provisions because
the SEC had already published for comment rules designed to accomplish similar objectives under its existing authority.
The Senate receded to the House. Although these provisions were
supportive of the basic accounting section, the use of the "knowingly"
standard has become involved in an issue never intended to be raised
or resolved by the Senate bill—namely, whether or not the inclusion
or deletion of the word "knowingly" would or would not affirm, expand, or overrule the decision of the Supreme Court in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder (425 U.S. 185). As stated clearly in the Committee Report on S. 305, these provisions were to be severable from the
rest of the securities laws.
Under the circumstances, the conferees determined the best method
of proceeding was to retain only new section 13(b) (2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The conferees further decided that this
legislation should not be converted into a debate on the important
issues raised by. the Hochfelder decision.
In deleting the Senate provisions, the conferees intend that no inference should be drawn with respect to any rulemaking authority the
SEC may or may not have under the securities laws.
d. National security
The Senate bill contained provisions which excluded from any duty
or liability under paragraph (2) any person acting in cooperation
with and at the specific written directive of any Federal agency or
department responsible for matters concerning national security. Such
directives were to be executed with specificity and to expire annually
unless renewed in writing. The President of the United States was directed to review such directives annually and to certify that such directives involved classified information and were in conformity to
applicable statutes and Executive orders.
The House amendment contained no provision.
The House receded to the Senate with an amendment. The amendment required that each directive be issued only pursuant to Presiden30

tial authority to issue such directives.
In addition, the amendment provides that a summary of all such
directives shall be submitted annually to the appropriate intelligence
oversight committees.
The conferees intend to make clear, as set forth in the Senate provision, that the only matters to be excluded from the requirements of
paragraph (2) are those which would result, or would be likely to
result, in the disclosure of information which has been classified by
the appropriate department or agency for protection in the interests
of the national security and then only to the extent that such information is specifically related to the person's lawful cooperation.
3. PAYMENTS TO OFFICIALS

a. Prohibitions against certain payments to foreign officials by issuers
subject to SEC jurisdiction
The Senate bill amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act") to prohibit the corrupt use of the mails or other
means of interstate commerce by any issuer of securities registered
with the SEC pursuant to section 12(b) or required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of the Exchange Act as well as any officer,
director, employee or stockholder acting on behalf of the issuer, in
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of
the payment of money or anything else of value to any official of a
foreign government or instrumentality thereof, any foreign political
party, any candidate for foreign political office, or any other person
which the issuer knows or has reason to know will make such offer,
promise or gift. The scope of the prohibition was limited by the
requirement that the offer, promise, authorization, payment, or giftmust have as a purpose inducing the recipient to use his influence with
the foreign government or instrumentality, influencing the enactment
or promulgation of legislation or regulations of that government or
instrumentality or refraining from performing any official responsibilities, so as to direct business to any person, maintain an established
business opportunity with any person or divert a business opportunity
from any person.
The House amendment was similar to the Senate bill; however, the
scope of the House amendment was not limited by the "business purpose" test, nor did it contain the "in furtherance of" requirement.
The conference substitute includes provisions found in both the Senate bill and the House amendment. In section 30A(a), the conferees
adopted the identical provisions of both bills with the addition of the
Senate "in furtherance of" language. The conference substitute prohibits corporations subject to SEC jurisdiction from making corrupt
use of the mails or other means of interstate commerce in furtherance
of an offer, payment, promise to pay or authorization of payment of
anything of value to any foreign official, foreign political party, candidate for foreign political office or any other person which the issuer
knows or has reason to know will make such offer, promise or payment.
The adoption of the Senate "in furtherance of" language makes clear
that, the use of interstate commerce need only be in furtherance of
making the corrupt payment.
By incorporating provisions from both bills, the conferees clarified
the scope of the prohibition by requiring that the purpose of the payment must be to influence any act or decision of a foreign official
(including a decision not to act) or to induce such official to use his
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influence to affect a government act or decision so as to assist an issuer
in obtaining, retaining or directing business to any person.
1. Definitions.—The Senate bill contained no definitional section.
The House amendment defined the terms "control" and "foreign
official". "Control" was defined as the power to exercise a controlling
influence over the management or policies of an issuer. Any person
who owned beneficially, either directly or through one or more controlled issuers, more than 50 percent of the voting securities of an
issuer, was presumed to control such issuer and any person who did
not own more than 50 percent of the voting securities of an issuer was
presumed not to have such control.
"Foreign official" was defined to mean any officer or employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality
thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of
such government, department, agency, or instrumentality. The term
did not include employees whose duties were primarily ministerial or
clerical.
The Senate receded to the House concerning the definition of "foreign official" and the House receded to the Senate concerning the definition of "control."
2. Penalties.—The Senate bill provided fines of not more than $500,000 for willful violations by issuers and penalties of up to $10,000 and/
or 5 years imprisonment for willful violations by any officer, director,
employee or shareholder thereof.
The House amendment provided a fine of not more than $1 million
for knowing and willful violations by an issuer. Penalties for knowing and willful violations by officers, directors, agents, or natural persons in control of any issuer were similar to those provided in the
Senate bill. However, an agent's liability was predicated upon a finding that the issuer violated the section. Finally, the House amendment
prohibited an issuer from paying either directly or indirectly any
fine imposed under this section upon any officer, director, agent or
natural person in control of such issuer.
The conference substitute adopts the maximum corporate penalty
in the House amendment and the penalties applicable to officers, directors, employees, and stockholders acting on behalf of the issuer
as provided in the Senate bill. The conference substitute incorporates
the "agent" provisions of the House amendment. To provide additional
protection for agents and employees, the conference substitute predicates an employee's or agent's liability upon a finding that the issuer
has violated the section. As in the House amendment, the conference
substitute prohibits an issuer from paying, either directly or indirectly, any fine imposed upon any individual under this section.
b. Prohibition against certain payments to foreign officials by domestic
concerns
Both the Senate bill and the House amendment applied their respective prohibitions and penalties from the previous sections to domestic
concerns other than those subject to SEC jurisdiction.
The conference substitute parallels the agreement reached by the
conferees with respect to the provisions governing issuers.
1. Definitions.—The Senate bill defined several terms used in this
section. "Domestic concern" is defined as an individual who is a citizen
or national of the United States as well as any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, or unincorporated organization which is owned or controlled by individuals who
are citizens or nationals of the United States and which has its prin32

cipal place of business in the United States or which is organized
under the laws of a State or any territory, possession or commonwealth of the United States.
The Senate bill restated the definition of interstate commerce in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The House amendment defined the terms "control" and "foreign
official" as previously discussed. In addition, the House amendment
defined the term "domestic concern" as any corporation, partnership,
association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization or sole proprietorship (1) which is owned or controlled by
individuals who are citizens or nationals of the United States, (2)
which has its principal place of business in the United States, or (3)
which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or
any territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States. The
House amendment extended the coverage of the section to U.S. controlled foreign subsidiaries.
The Senate receded to the House concerning the definition of "foreign official." The House receded to the Senate concerning the definition of control. The House receded to the Senate in the definition of
"domestic concern" with an amendment to make clear that any company having a principal place of business in the United States would
be subject to the bill.
In receding to the Senate, the conferees recognized the inherent jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by the
inclusion of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in the direct prohibitions of the bill. However, the conferees intend to make clear that
any issuer or domestic concern which engages in bribery of foreign
officials indirectly through any other person or entity would itself be
liable under the bill. The conferees recognized that such jurisdictional,
enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties may not be present in the case
of individuals who are U.S. citizens, nationals, or residents. Therefore,
individuals other than those specifically covered by the bill (e.g.,
officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on behalf
of an issuer or domestic concern) will be liable when they act in relation to the affairs of any foreign subsidiary of an issuer or domestic
concern if they are citizens, nationals, or residents of the United
States. In addition, the conferees determined that foreign nationals or
residents otherwise under the jurisdiction of the United States would
be covered by the bill in circumstances where an issuer or domestic
concern engaged in conduct proscribed by the bill.
Department of Justice injunctive power.—The House amendment
authorized the Department of Justice to enforce violations of the bill
by domestic concerns through civil injunctions.
The Senate bill contained no provision. The Senate receded to the
House.
H A R L E Y O . STAGGERS,
B O B ECKHARDT,
R A L P H H . METCALF,
ROBERT KRUEGER,
CHARLES J . C A R N E Y ,
SAMUEL DEVINE,
J I M BROYHILL,

Managers on the
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W I L L I A M PROXMIRE,
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HARRISON A . W I L L I A M S ,
EDWARD W . BROOKE,
J O H N TOWER,

JR.,

Managers on the
Part of the Senate.

33

Excerpts from Senate Report 114,
Foreign Corrupt Practices And Foreign
Investment Disclosure Acts of 1977

Calendar No. 9 3
)

9 5 T H CONGRESS

SENATE

(
(

1st Session

FOREIGN
FOREIGN

CORRUPT

PRACTICES

INVESTMENT

A N D

DISCLOSURE

REPORT

No. 114

DOMESTIC
ACTS

OF

A N D
1977

MAT 2 (legislative d a y , MARCH 28), 1977.—Ordered t o b e p r i n t e d

Mr.

from the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, submitted the following

PROXMIRE,

REPORT
[to a c c o m p a n y S. 3 0 5 ]

The Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs favorably
reports a bill (S. 305) to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to require companies subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission to maintain accurate records, to prohibit
certain bribes, to expand and improve disclosure of ownership of the
securities of U.S. companies, and for other purposes, and recommends
that the bill, as amended by the committee, do pass.
H I S T O R Y OF THE B I L L

During the 94th Congress, the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs held extensive hearings on the matter of improper
payments to foreign government officials by American corporations.
The committee also considered several bills designed to deal with the
roblem in various ways including S. 3133 introduced by Senator
Proxmire on March 11, 1976; S. 3379 introduced by Senators Church,
Clark, and Pearson on May 5,1976, and S. 3418 introduced by Senator
Proxmire at the request of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on May 12, 1976.
On May 12, 1976, the committee received from the SEC an extensive
"Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices," ("SEC report") which summarized the SEC's enforcement
activities and findings to that date. That report traced the history of
the Commission's discovery of conduct involving the misuse of corporate funds and the commencement of investigations which subsequently revealed that instances of undisclosed questionable or illegal
corporate payments were indeed widespread and represented a serious
breach in the operation of the Commission's system of corporate
disclosure and, correspondingly, in public confidence in the integrity
of the system of capital formation. The SEC report also analyzed the
public filings of 89 corporations that had disclosed varying types of
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questionable payments, plus six special reports obtained as the result
of SEC enforcement actions and the allegations made in eight additional cases in which the SEC had obtained some form of judicial
relief. Finally, the report contained the SEC's analysis of the degree
of disclosure required concerning questionable foreign payments under
the existing Federal securities laws and outlined the legislative and
other responses which the Commission recommended to remedy
these problems.
On June 22, 1976, the committee met and ordered reported a bill,
S. 3664, which incorporated the SEC's recommendations and a direct
rohibition against
the payment of overseas bribes by any U.S.
usiness concern.1 On September 15, 1976 the Senate, by a unanimous
vote of 86-0 passed S. 3664. The House of Representatives, however,
did not complete work on that legislation before its adjournment on
October 2, 1976.
Title II of S. 305, which would amend the Federal securities laws
to enhance the present system of disclosure of the ownership of
American business, has also been the subject of numerous hearings
and careful deliberation by the committee in the past. Last year, as
part of S. 3084, the committee reported favorably 2 and the Senate
passed the disclosure provisions as title III of S. 3084. No final action
was taken by the Congress on this bill prior to adjournment either.
Shortly after the 95th Congress convened on January 18, 1977,
Senators Proxmire and Williams introduced S. 305. As introduced,
title I of the bill was identical to S. 3664, the measure which the Senate
had passed unanimously during the prior Congress and title II was
substantially the same as Title II of S. 3084.
The committee held hearings on S. 305 on March 16, 1977, and received testimony from Senator Metealf, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Department of the Treasury, the American Bankers
Association, and the Securities Industry Association. Subsequently,
on April 7, 1977, the committee met in open session to consider S. 305.
The committee ordered the bill, with an amendment, to be reported
to the Senate.
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SUMMARY OF T H E

BILL

A. TITLE I—CORPORATE BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS

Title I of S. 305 is designed to prevent the use of corporate funds for
corrupt purposes. As reported, Title I:
1. Requires companies subject to the jursidiction of the SEC to
maintain strict accounting standards and management control over
their assets;
2. Prohibits the falsification of accounting records and the deceit of
accountants auditing the books and records of such companies; and
3. Makes it a crime for U.S. companies to bribe a foreign government official for the specified corrupt purposes. Companies violating
the criminal prohibitions face maximum fines of $500,000. Individuals
acting on behalf of such companies face a maximum fine of $10,000
and 5 years in jail.
In the past, corporate bribery has been concealed by the falsification
of corporate books and records. Title I removes this avenue of coverup,
reinforcing the criminal sanctions which are intended to serve as the
1

See Senate Report No. 94-1031, 94th Cong., 2d sess.
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Export Administration Amendments, Foreign Boycotts, and Domestic and Foreign Investments Improved Disclosure Acts of 1976.
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significant deterrent to corporate bribery. Taken together, the accounting requirements and criminal prohibitions of Title I should effectively
deter corporate bribery of foreign government officials.
N E E D FOR L E G I S L A T I O N
A. TITLE I—CORPORATE BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS

Recent investigations by the SEC have revealed corrupt foreign
payments by over 300 U.S. companies involving hundreds of millions
of dollars. These revelations have had severe adverse effects. Foreign
overnments friendly to the United States in Japan, Italy, and the
Netherlands have come under intense pressure from their own people.
The image of American democracy abroad has been tarnished. Confidence in the financial integrity of our corporations has been impaired.
The efficient functioning of our capital markets has been hampered.
Corporate bribery is bad business. In our free market system it is
basic that the sale of products should take place on the basis of price,
quality, and service. Corporate bribery is fundamentally destructive
of this basic tenet. Corporate bribery of foreign officials takes place
primarily to assist corporations in gaining business. Thus foreign
corporate bribery affects the very stability of overseas business.
Foreign corporate bribes also affect our domestic competitive climate
when domestic firms engage in such practices as a substitute for
healthy competition for foreign business.
Managements which resort to corporate bribery and the falsifacation
of records to enhance their business reveal a lack of confidence about
themselves. Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal, in appearing
before the committee in support of the criminalization of foreign
corporate bribery testified that: "Paying bribes—apart from being
morally repugnant and illegal in most countries—is simply not necessary for the successful conduct of business here or overseas."
The committee concurs in Secretary Blumenthal's judgment. Many
U.S. firms have taken a strong stand against paying foreign bribes and
are still able to compete in international trade. Unfortunately, the
reputation and image of all U.S. businessmen has been tarnished by the
activities of a sizable number, but by no means a majority of American
firms. A strong antibribery law is urgently needed to bring these
corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public confidence in the
integrity of the American business system.

g

N A T U R E OF T H E

LEGISLATION

A. TITLE I — C O R P O R A T E B R I B E R Y OF FOREIGN

OFFICIALS

1. Accurate accounting
The committee recognizes that the SEC has broad authority to
promulgate accounting standards for companies subject to jurisdiction
under its existing authority. Nevertheless, the committee believes the
Commission's current program for accurate accounting should be
supplemented by an explicit statement of statutory policy. The accounting standards in S. 305 are intended to operate in tandem with
the criminalization provisions of the bill to deter corporate bribery.
S. 305 expresses a public policy which encompasses a unified approach
to the matter of corporate bribery.
This legislation imposes affirmative requirements on issuers to
maintain books and records which accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions of the corporation and to design an adequate system of
internal controls to assure, among other things, that the assets of the
issuer are used for proper corporate purpose. The committee believes
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that the imposition of these affirmative duties under our securities
laws coupled with attendant civil liability and criminal penalties for
failure to comply with the statutory standard will go a long way to
prevent the use of corporate assets for corrupt purposes. Public
confidence in securities markets will be enhanced by assurance that
corporate recordkeeping is honest.
Section 102 of the bill as reported amends section 13(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act by adding new paragraphs (b)(2), (b)(3),
(b)(4), and (b)(5). The provisions of section 102 apply to issuers
which have securities listed on an exchange pursuant to subsection
12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, to issuers which meet the
requirements of section 12(g) of that Act, and to issuers subject to
the reporting requirement of section 15(d) of the Act.
The purpose of section 102 is to strengthen the accuracy of the
corporate books and records and the reliability of the audit process
which constitute the foundations of our system of corporate disclosure.
Section 102 substantially embodies the measures which the SEC
recommended to the committee in its May 22, 1976, report on questionable payments. New subparagraph (b)(2)(A) imposes an obligation on issuers to maintain books and records that accurately and
fairly reflect
the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuers.5
Subparagraph (b)(2)(B) would require issuers to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that, among other things, transactions
are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles
or any other applicable criteria. Because the accounting profession
has defined the objectives of a system of accounting control, the
definition of the objectives contained in this subparagraph is taken
from the authoritative accounting literature. See American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 1, 320.28 (1973).
The establishment and maintenance of a system of internal controls
is an important management/obligation. A fundamental aspect of
management's stewardship responsibility is to provide shareholders
with reasonable assurances that the business is adequately controlled.
Additionally, management has a responsibility to furnish shareholders
and potential investors with reliable financial information on a timely
basis. An adequate system of internal accounting controls is necessary
to management's dsicharge of these obligations.
The committee understands that auditors customarily provide
management with comments on the state of the client's internal
controls. Those comments are designed to assist the issuer in improving its system of internal controls and thereby to assist the
auditor in the conduct of its audit. The committee recognizes that no
system of internal controls is perfect, and that there will always be
room for improvement. Auditor's comments and suggestions to
management on possible improvements are to be encouraged.
The establishment and maintenance of a system of internal control
and accurate books and records are fundamental responsibilities of
management. The expected benefits to be derived from the conscientious discharge of these responsibilities are of basic importance to
5
The phrase "dispositions of its assets" is not intended as a limitation on the scope of
the requirement that accurate books and records be maintained. The issuer's responsibility
to keep records correctly reflecting the status of its liabilities and equities is no less than
its obligation to maintain such records concerning its assets. The word "transactions" in
the bill encompasses accuracy in accounts of every character.
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investors and the maintenance of the integrity of our capital market
system. The committee recognizes, however, that management
must exercise judgment in determining the steps to be taken, and the
cost incurred, in giving assurance that the objectives expressed will be
achieved. Here, standards of reasonableness must apply. In this
regard, the term "accurately" does not mean exact precision as
measured by some abstract principle. Rather it means that an issuer's
records should reflect transactions in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles or other applicable criteria. While
management should observe every reasonable prudence in satisfying
the objectives called for in new paragraph (2) of section 13(b), the
committee recognizes that management must necessarily estimate and
evaluate the cost/benefit relationships of the steps to be taken in
fulfillment of its responsibilities under this paragraph. The accounting
profession will be expected to use their professional judgment in
evaluating the systems maintained by issuers. The size of the business,
diversity of operations, degree of centralization of financial and operating management, amount of contact by top management with day-today operations, and numerous other circumstances are factors which
management must consider in establishing and maintaining an
internal accounting controls system.
2. Prohibition against falsification of accounting records and deception
of auditors
Paragraph (b)(3) would make it unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, knowingly to falsify any book, record or account maintained, or required to be maintained, for an accounting purpose of an
issuer subject to paragraph (b)(2) of section 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. This paragraph covers both actions of commission and omission.
Paragraph (b)(4) would prohibit knowingly making false or misleading statements, or knowingly omitting to state facts necessary to
be stated, to an accountant in connection with any audit or examination of issuers identified in paragraph (b)(2) of section 13 of the
Securities Exchange Act. This paragraph would also apply to audits
in connection with a securities offering registered or to be registered
under the Securities Act of 1933. Concepts of aiding and abetting are
applicable to conduct covered by these sections. By specifically prohibiting the making of knowingly materially false or misleading statements or omissions to auditors, the bill is designed to encourage
careful communications between the auditors and persons from whom
the auditors seek information in the audit process. The committee is
of the view that a proscription on knowing false statements to auditors
will enhance the integrity of the auditing process.
The amendments to section 13(b) prohibiting the falsification of
corporate books and records and the making of misleading representations to auditors are not intended to make unlawful conduct which
is merely negligent. To clarify the purpose of these paragraphs,
therefore, the committee inserted the term "knowingly" in appropriate
places in both paragraphs (3) and (4). As explained to the committee,
the term "knowingly" connotes a "conscious undertaking." Thus
these paragraphs proscribe and make unlawful conduct which is
rooted in a conscious undertaking to falsify records or mislead auditors
through a statement or conscious omission of material facts.
The committee believes that the inclusion of the "knowingly"
standard is appropriate because of the danger, inherent in matters
relating to financial recordkeeping, that inadvertent misstatements
or minor discrepancies arising from an unwitting error in judgment
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might be deemed actionable. The committee does not, however, intend
that the use of the terming "knowingly" will provide a defense for
those who shield themselves from the facts. The knowledge required
is that the defendant be aware that he is committing the act which
is false—not that he know that his conduct is illegal. The inclusion of
this standard is intended to be limited to matters arising under these
new subsections and not to any other provisions of the securities laws.
As a result, in this limited instance, in order to prove that falsification of corporate accounting records or deception of auditors is
"knowingly" committed, the Commission will be required to establish
this element in actions arising under new paragraphs 13(b)(3) and
13(b)(4).
The knowledge required is that the person be aware that he is or
may be making a false statement or causing corporate records to be
falsified through a conscious undertaking or due to his conscious
disregard for the truth.
The bill, as reported, would also permit the head of any agency or
department responsible for national security matters to exempt, on a
limited basis, an issuer involved in an endeavor related to national
security from the accounting and reporting requirements of the bill.
The facts and circumstances to which the directive applies must be
reported to the President.
3.Criminalization of foreign bribery
The committee recognizes that the SEC has diligently sought to
enforce the existing provisions of the Federal securities laws by requiring corporate reports to disclose "material" payments. Nevertheless, the committee has concluded that—"The serious abuses which
the Commission has uncovered justify an explicit congressional
affirmation of our national commitment of ending corrupt foreign
payments. While the Commission has made substantial progress in
its enforcement program, the committee believes that legislation is
appropriate to make clear that cessation of these abuses is a matter,
not merely of SEC concern, but of national policy."
Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal supported the criminalization
of overseas bribery in testimony before the committee. The committee
considered the matter extensively in the 94th Congress and concluded
that the criminalization approach was preferred over a disclosure
approach. Direct criminalization entails no reporting burden on
corporations and less of an enforcement burden on the Government.
The criminalization of foreign corporate bribery will to a significant
extent act as a self-enforcing, preventative mechanism.
Sections 103 and 104 of the bill provide criminal penalties for
foreign corporate bribery. Section 103 applies to issuers and reporting
firms under the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 104 applies to all
other domestic concerns. Under sections 103 and 104, a corporation is
prohibited from making payments to a foreign official for the purpose
of inducing him to obtain or retain business for the corporation or to
influence legislation or regulations of the Government.
Payment to officials of a foreign political office having the purposes
set forth respecting payments to foreign government officials are likewise proscribed. And payments to agents, while knowing or having
reason to know, that all or a portion of the payment will be offered or
given to a foreign government official, foreign political party or
candidate for foreign political office for the proscribed purposes are
also forbidden.
The statute covers payments made to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining business or influencing legislation or regulations. The
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statute does not, therefore, cover so-called "grease payments" such as
payments for expediting shipments through customs or placing a
transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits, or obtaining
adequate police protection, transactions which may involve even
the proper performance of duties.
The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the offer,
payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to
misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the
payor or his client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable
regulation. The word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose,
an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. It does not require
that the act be fully consummated, or succeed in producing the
desired outcome.
Sections 103 and 104 cover payments and gifts intended to influence
the recipient, regardless of who first suggested the payment or gift.
The defense that the payment was demanded on the part of a government official as a price for gaining entry into a market or to obtain a
contract would not suffice since at some point the U.S. company
would make a conscious decision whether or not to pay a bribe. That
the payment may have been first proposed by the recipient rather
than the U.S. company does not alter the corrupt purpose on the
part of the person paying the bribe. On the other hand true extortion
situations would not be covered by this provision since a payment to an
official to keep an oil rig from being dynamited should not be held to
be made with the requisite corrupt purpose.
Section 305 as reported also covers the officers, directors, employees,
or stockholders making overseas bribes on behalf of the corporation.
This provision is intended to make clear that it is corporate or business
bribery which is being proscribed. Whether or not a particular situation involves b r i b e r y by the corporation or by an individual acting
on his own will depend on all the facts and circumstances, including
the position of the employee, the care with which the board of directors supervises management, the care with which management supervises employees in sensitive positions and its adherence to the strict
accounting standards set forth under section 102. The prohibitions
against corrupt payments apply in this regard to payments by agents
where the corporation paying them knew or had reason to know they
would be passed on in whole or in part to a foreign government official
for a proscribed purpose. Of course, where the corporation knows
the payment will be passed on for a proscribed purpose, the violation
is complete.
The committee has recognized that the bill would not reach all
corrupt overseas payments. For example, the bill would not cover payments by foreign nationals acting solely on behalf of foreign subsidiaries where there is no nexus with U.S. interstate commerce or the
use of U.S. mails and where the issuer, reporting company, or domestic
concern had no knowledge of the payment. But a U.S. company
which "looks the other way" in order to be able to raise the defense
that they were ignorant of bribes made by a foreign subsidiary, could
be in violation of section 102 requiring companies to devise and maintain adequate accounting controls. Under the accounting section no
off-the-books accounting fund could be lawfully maintained, either
by a U.S. parent or by a foreign subsidiary, and no improper payment
could be lawfully disguised.
Enforcement responsibilities
After careful consideration the committee concluded that the SEC
should continue to have a role in the investigation of violations of the
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criminal prohibitions as they apply to companies under the jurisdiction
of the SEC. The SEC has been the principal agency of the Government taking the lead in the investigation of foreign bribery. This is
as it should be for the bribery of foreign officials often violates our
securities laws to the extent the payment is not disclosed to investors.
The SEC has thus developed considerable expertise in investigation
corrupt overseas payments. This same expertise can be put to work
in investigating potential violations of the antibribery provisions of
this legislation. If this investigative responsibility were to be assigned
solely to the Justice Department, as some had advocated, that agency
would have to duplicate the investigative capability already in the
SEC at a greater cost to the Government.
It should be emphasized that while the SEC investigates potential
violations of the securities laws, the only remedy it can bring on its
own is an injunctive action. When the SEC believes it has compiled
enough evidence for a criminal action, it refers the case to the Justice
Department for criminal prosecution. This same division of responsibility would also apply with respect to the antibribery provisions of
this legislation.
The committee believes this division of responsibility will result in a
stronger enforcement effort compared to an exclusive assignment to
the Justice Department. I t is often difficult to assemble the degree of
evidence required in a criminal action, but enough evidence may exist
to enable the SEC to halt a continuation of the corrupt practices
through an injunctive action.
The committee expects that close cooperation will develop between
the SEC and the Justice Department at the earliest stage of any
investigation in order to insure that the evidence needed for a criminal
prosecution does not become stale. The arrangements which the committee expects the SEC and Justice to work out on criminal matters is
in no way intended to cast doubt upon the authority of the SEC to
prosecute and defend its own civil litigation. Under the bill, the Justice
Department retains sole investigative and prosecutional jurisdiction
over domestic concerns covered but which are not otherwise within the
jurisdiction of the SEC.
The committee believes that, by assigning to the SEC enforcement
responsibilities for the new prohibition, it will strengthen the Commission's ability to enforce compliance with the existing reguirements
of the securities laws, and with the new accounting provisions recommended by the Commission and included as section 102 of the bill.
Obviously, there may be practical impediments to enforcement in
individual cases, just as proof of bribery and other white collar crimes
is often difficult to obtain in domestic cases. Nonetheless, the Commission's enforcement efforts under existing U.S. law demonstrate that it
is entirely feasible for U.S. agencies successfully to investigate improper foreign payments made on behalf of American corporations.
The SEC's responsibilities would extend to conducting investigations, bringing civil injunctive
actions, commencing administrative
proceedings if appropriate, 6 defending lawsuits against the Commission
and its staff arising out of the Commission's obligations under this Act,
and referring cases to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution
on a timely basis. The Commission, of course, will retain all of its existing remedies under the securities laws, and the committee anticipates
6
For example, rule 2(e) of the Commission's rules of practice, 17 CFR 201.2(e),
authorizes the Commission to censure, suspend, or bar professionals, such as accountants
and lawyers, from practicing before the Commission. A public or private rule 2(e) proceeding might, in the Commission's view, be preferable, or used in addition to a civil
injunctive action or criminal referral, in particular cases.
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that the Commission will continue to tailor remedies to fit the circumstances of specific cases.
SECTION-BY-SECTION

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this legislation would be accomplished by amending
existing sections 13(b), 13(d), 15(d), and 32(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("the act") and by adding new sections 13(g),
13(h), and new section 30A, to the act. Further, a new provision would
be added to the criminal code.
A. TITLE I — F O R E I G N CORRUPT PRACTICES

Short title
Section 101. This title may be cited as the "Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977."
Integrity of accounting records and reports
Section 102 of the bill would amend section 13 of the Exchange
Act by renumbering existing subsection (b) as (b)(1) and by adding
four new paragraphs. New paragraph 13(b)(2) would apply only
to issuers which have a class of securities registered pursuant to section
12 of the act and issuers required to file reports pursuant to section
15(d) of the act ("reporting companies"). It would require reporting
companies to make and keep books, records, and accounts which
accurately and fairly reflect all of their transactions and dispositions
of assets.
A reporting company also would be required to establish and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls sufficient
to provide reasonable assurances that:
(1) Transactions are executed in accordance with management
directions;
(2) Transactions are recorded in a manner that permits the
company to prepare its financial statements in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles or other applicable
criteria and to maintain accountability for its assets;
(3) Access to company assets is permitted only in accordance
with management authorization; and
(4) The recorded accountability for assets is compared with
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is
taken with respect to differences.
New Paragraph (3) would make it unlawful for any person knowingly to falsify or cause to be falsified any book, record, or account
of a reporting company which has been made or is required to be made
for any accounting purpose.
New paragraph (4) would make it unlawful for any person knowingly to make or cause to be made a materially false or misleading
statement or to omit to state or cause another person to omit to state
any material fact necessary in order to make statements to an accountant not misleading. This paragraph would apply to statements made
to an accountant in connection with any examination or audit of an
issuer with securities registered or to be registered under the Securities
Act of 1933, as well as any examination or audit of a reporting company.
New paragraph (5) would provide that no duty or liability could be
imposed under new paragraphs (2), (3), or (4) upon any person acting
pursuant to a written directive of the head of an agency responsible
for national security. This exclusion only applies, however, to the
extent that the requirements of new paragraphs (2), (3), or (4) would
be likely to result in the disclosure of properly classified national
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security information. Every directive executed by a national security
agency head under this paragraph would have to describe specifically
the facts which are not to be disclosed and the surrounding circumstances. These directives would expire annually unless renewed in
writing. Agency heads would maintain a file of these directives, and
each year on October 1 all directives in force during the prior year
would have to be transmitted to the President for his review and
certification that all conformed to law.
Prohibition against certain payments to officials by registered companies
Section 103 of the bill would add a new section 30A to the Act to
prohibit any reporting company, or any officer, director, or employee,
or shareholder acting on behalf of such a company, to use the mails
or the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce corruptly
in furtherance of an offer, payment, or promise to pay, or authorization
of the payment of, any money, or offer, gift, or promise to give anything of value, to three classes of persons :
(1) An official of a foreign government or instrumentality of a
foreign government,
(2) A foreign political party or an official of a foreign political party,
or a candidate for a foreign political office, or
(3) Any other person while the issuer knows or has reason to know
that money or a gift will be offered, promised or given to an official
of a foreign political party, or a candidate for a foreign political office.
The scope of section 30A is limited by the requirement that the offer,
promise, authorization, payment, or gift must have as a purpose
inducing the recipient to use influence with the foreign government
or instrumentality, or to refrain from performing any official responsibilities, so as to direct business to any person, maintain an established
business opportunity with any person, divert any business opportunity
from any person or influence the enactment or promulgation of legislation or regulations of that government or instrumentality.
Prohibition against certain payments to officials by other domestic concerns
Section 104 of the bill would prohibit persons included in the definition of the term "domestic concern" who would not be covered by
new section 30A of the Act from engaging in any of the same types of
conduct prohibited by that section.
The term "domestic concern" is defined in the bill to mean an
individual who is a citizen or national of the United States as well as
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, or unincorporated organization which is owned or controlled
by individuals who are citizens or nationals of the United States and
which has its principal place of business in the United States or any
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
The term "interstate commerce" is defined to mean trade, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State or between any State and
any place or ship on trade thereof. The term includes the interstate
use of a telephone or other interstate means of communication and
the intrastate use of any other interstate instrumentality.
The penalties for each violation of section 103 or section 104 would
be a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both,
but in the case of a corporation a fine of up to $500,000 could be
imposed.
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